10 November 1915 - decision to evacuate Allied troops from Gallipoli

Lord Kitchener in the trenches at Gallipoli

British secretary of war Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener visits the trenches at Gallipoli, in Turkey [Getty Images]

C.E.W. Bean's official war history notes that Lord Kitchener visited Lemnos and the Dardanelles for four days commencing 10 November 1915. He was sent by the Asquith government to assume responsibility for deciding on either evacuation, or retention of the current stalemate, or to continue further assaults against the Turkish forces and what resources would be required for that campaign to be successful.

General Birdwood's advice to Kitchener was that with an additional three to four divisions the Turks could be overcome. However this number of troops and the added support required were not available. The Royal Navy convinced Kitchener that all naval options had already been pursued. An alternative was to assess whether it would be possible to extend the present stalemate through the winter and thereby hold up the Turkish forces and prevent them from being deployed elsewhere.The possible withdrawal of the troops was also explored and the merits of redeployment in another theatre were discussed.

Kitchener spent 13 and 14 November at Anzac Cove and Suvla where he was warmly greeted by the men. He told them that 'The King asked me to tell you how splendidly he thinks you have done - you have done splendidly, ....' He visited Walker's Ridge, Russell's Top, and looked out over towards The Nek. He surveyed Pope's, Quinn's Post and the Lone Pine area. He became convinced that these trenches and positions could be held against the Turks thereby tying down nearly the whole of the Turkish army.

Eventually Kitchener, together with Birdwood and other senior military staff, de Robeck (Royal Navy) and other senior officials agreed that the troops would be evacuated. It was decided that these troops would be more effectively deployed by defending British interests in Egypt by attacking Turkish communications - probably at Ayas, near Alexandretta which was the sole railway line to Palestine and Baghdad.

A key consideration was how to arrange the removal of 80,000 men, 5,000 horses and 200 guns from the peninsular. Bearing in mind the great losses inflicted on our forces during the landing in particular, further large losses of men and equipment during a withdrawal would have made this already failed mission an even greater catastrophe. In mid-October, in a reply to a Kitchener enquiry, Sir Ian Hamilton, Commander-in-chief of the Gallipoli forces, estimated that the loss of troops during a withdrawal may be as high as 50 per cent.  However, Sir Ian was replaced by General Sir Charles Munro on 16 October. Munro would have relied heavily on the senior staff around him including Birdwood at the time of Kitchener's visit in mid-November. Birdwood made the crucial assessment that the Gallipoli troops could be evacuated with fewer losses than was previously estimated. This made the evacuation option more viable.

So whilst Athol was in the Maadi Camp, in command of the 5th Battalion's transport section, the key decision was made to evacuate from Gallipoli. Athol never returned to the peninsular but remained in Egypt for the remainer of his war service.



Follow this link to the AWM full text of CEW Bean's chapter 'Fate of the Expedition', Vol.2, Chapter 22, 'The Story of ANZAC from 4 May, 1915, to the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula' (11th edition, 1941)': https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/RCDIG1069535/
(particularly: pp.790-792).

Statistics from: Staniforth Smith, 'Australian Campaigns in the Great War', Macmillan, 1919. Particularly pp.40-41.